I'd read Mind some time ago but had forgotten a bunch of it so was re-reading portions and ran across the bits on free-will in passing.Shatterface wrote:To be honest I can't even remember Pinker's position on determinism - and I've read most of his books.Steersman wrote:In any case, somewhat apropos of which, think you suggested or argued earlier that Jerry may have been influenced in that direction by Pinker; was just reading some of the latter's How the Mind Works and he certainly seemed anything but dogmatic on the issue.
Indeed - the whole concept of psychopathology, or at least sociopathology, seems predicated on the premise, on the dichotomy, that most "normal" people have control on their desires and urges, and can "choose" not to give free rein to them whereas sociopaths & psychopaths can't or won't. Absent some degree of agency, of free-will, hard to see how the concept of psychopathology has any meaning or relevance at all.Shatterface wrote:Whatever it is he doesn't seem to feel the need to drag it into every conversation. I don't see how it adds to the discussion of whether Harvey Weinstein is a psychopath or not. If you've decided that nobody has free will anyway then having a personality disorder or poor impulse control is irrelevant because we are all just going through the motions anyway.
A couple of relevant quotes from Mind:
Nice to see that he emphasized the "as seen by science" as it too has its limitations, something that Jerry seems unwilling to consider. Pinker said later on in the book, in a related context of how to deal with such problems:Pinker wrote:Either we dispense with all morality as an unscientific superstition, or we find a way to reconcile causation (genetic or otherwise) with responsibility and free will. .... I believe that science and ethics are two self-contained systems played out among the same entities in the world, just as poker and bridge are different games played with the same fifty-two-card deck. .... Free will is an idealization of human beings that makes the ethics game playable. Euclidean geometry requires idealizations like infinite straight lines and perfect circles, and its deductions are sound and useful even though the world does not really have infinite straight lines or perfect circles. .... Similarly, ethical theory requires idealizations like free, sentient, rational, equivalent agents whose behaviour is uncaused, and its conclusions can be sound and useful even though the world, as seen by science, does not really have uncaused events. .... [pg 55]
I think he's kind of alluding to, or basing his perspective on, the argument that the science and ethics "games" are just models, each of which has its limitations. And that free-will in particular is more of an imprecisely defined term than not, even if there may be, probably is I think, some substance to it. In part why I've argued for degrees of freedom, of free-will: we're not free to fly to the moon in an act of will but it sure looks like we're free to choose between a limited number of options in many circumstances. Kind of think that makes us "First Causes" - to a limited extent in any case - although that tends not to be a particularly popular position in itself for one reason or another. :-)A second approach is to deny that there is a problem. We have been misled by fuzzy thinking or by beguiling but empty idioms of language, such as the pronoun I. Statements about consciousness, will, self, and ethics cannot be verified by mathematical proof or empirical test, so they are meaningless. But this answer leaves us incredulous, not enlightened. As Descartes observed, our own consciousness is the most indubitable thing there is. .... [pg 561]